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Ireland and the Global Economic Crisis: One Island, Two Different Experiences. 
(This is a draft version of the chapter of the same name which appears in Murphy, M., and  Dukelow, F., (2016) 
The Irish Welfare State in the Twenty-First Century: challenges and change, Palgrave Macmillan, London.) 
 
Introduction 
The financial crisis which hit the global economy in 2008 and, more specifically, the 
responses to it in the industrialised rich world, led not just to a re-moulding of capitalism, but 
to increased clarity about both the lack of global democracy and what Pilger (2002)  has 
termed ‘the new rulers of the world’.  Neo-liberal minimalist state regulation of financial 
institutions, and the economy in general, was replaced by high state interventionist ‘austerity’ 
measures, aimed at protecting capitalist financial structures.  In the EU, Governments 
nationalised private debt, spreading the costs across their local communities, largely to ensure 
that capitalism as an economic structure and ideology was maintained.  The ‘imagined 
community’ (Anderson, 1983) of the EU and the concept of ‘European-ness’ (Calligaro, 
2013) - used to promote the idea of a greater social and economic union from the 1970s 
(Armstrong and Anderson, 2007; Sjursen, 2007) -  gave way to single state nationalism and 
cross-national capitalist solidarity as the bigger economies banded together to protect their 
national interests and in particular the interests of their banks and their bondholders 
(Fligstein, 2014).   
 
Smaller EU states, having progressively relinquished sovereignty to the larger states, from 
Maastricht (1992) to Lisbon (2007) to the Euro (2002), in the interests of ‘Europeanisation’, 
realised that they no longer controlled their own economies, budgets or fiscal arrangements.  
Ideological choices appeared limited in smaller states – either accept the new ‘austerity’ 
measures,  enthusiastically, as the only solution to a global crisis, or accept them, reluctantly.   
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What Greece’s former Finance Minister, Yanis Varoufakis, was to call financial ‘terrorism’ 
was in town (Varoufakis, 2015).   
 
In this atmosphere, the two parts of Ireland, North and South
i
, were to have different 
experiences of austerity and of the global crisis, reflecting different social, economic, and 
political contexts and influences, different forms of democratic control, and different 
financial arrangements within the EU.  This chapter looks at some of these differences 
focusing first on the South and then on the North. 
  
Austerity and the Irish State. 
The Fianna Fáil Government’s decision to guarantee and then pay off the private debts of the 
Irish Banks in 2008 - the result of EU and European Central Bank (ECB) pressure, according 
to the then Taoiseach, Brian Cowen, (Cowen, 2015) – combined with the onset of global 
recession and the subsequent Troika loan in 2010, heralded in a long period of ‘austerity’ in 
the South of Ireland (Considine, and Dukelow, 2012).   
 
Although largely dictated by the Troika, ‘austerity’ was generally supported by both the 
Fianna Fáil (2008-11) and the subsequent Fine Gael-led (2011-16) Governments.  Both 
governments appeared to take the approach that austerity was the best policy for the state, not 
because they felt so ideologically, but because that was what the Troika and their economic 
advisors were saying.   This doesn’t mean that ‘austerity’ in the Irish state wasn’t 
‘ideological’, it was, since it operated within a Gramscian ‘common sense’ hegemonic 
discourse where the few voices on the Left arguing against it were marginalised.  However, 
the Irish state’s approach within that ideological hegemonic discourse appeared as pragmatic 
acceptance of what the powerful were saying and doing  - possibly in the hope that this would 
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ultimately position the state favourably within the global economy (dominated by such 
ideological thinking).  There was certainly little in the Government’s rhetoric or indeed in the 
Irish media, to suggest that the discourse of ‘austerity’ was something that should be rejected.  
A different discourse did exist, it just wasn’t heard in the South of Ireland, other than from 
the margins.  Noble prize-winning economists, Thomas Piketty, Joseph Stiglitz and Paul 
Krugman, and others (Piketty et al, 2015; Stiglitz, 2015; Krugman, 2015), rejected ‘austerity’ 
as a practice and an ideological approach.  Indeed,  both the US Government under President 
Obama (2009 – 2016) and the British Labour Government under Prime Minister Brown 
(2005-10) attempted to develop a different response to the EU’s, based on what was termed 
‘quantitative easing’ (basically cancelling Government debt) - using monetary policy to try 
and stimulate the economy (Blyth, 2015).  Neither Britain nor the USA was in the Eurozone, 
providing more freedom to make decisions relating to monetary policy.  Brown, however, 
was voted out of power in 2010, and a new Conservative-led Coalition, took office in Britain, 
ideologically committed to a programme of ‘austerity’.    
 
The Irish Government, in the Eurozone, and lacking the greater financial independence of the 
USA or Britain, were forced to hand over tight control of the budget, fiscal arrangements and 
public expenditure, to the Troika, which supervised large scale cuts to public expenditure, 
services and benefits, increased privatisation and the introduction of a range of new 
regressive taxation measures, ultimately disproportionately affecting the poorer sections of 
society (ESRI, 2015; Collins, 2014; IHREC, 2015).  Eurozone membership rules requiring 
Governments to keep a budget deficit of less than 3% of their GDP and a debt ratio of less 
than 60% of GDP (ECB, 2015), not only ensured ‘austerity’ in terms of public expenditure it 
also ensured further privatisation of services into the future by limiting Government 




The total cost of the Irish state’s bank bailout was estimated in 2012 at €62.8bn (Whelan 
2012:471).  Indeed Taft (2013) estimated that up to 2013, the Irish state paid for 42% of the 
total cost of the European banking crisis, equivalent to €9,000 per person compared to an EU 
average of €192 per person.   Austerity measures meant that from 2008 to 2014 there were 
€19bn in public spending cuts and €11bn in tax increases (Goodbody, 2014; Healy 2015a).    
As a result, unemployment in the Irish state increased to a peak of 15% in 2012 (CSO, 
2015a), underemployment increased to a peak of 25.8% in 2012, (Healy, 2015b), wages 
decreased (CSO, 2015b) and deprivation rates increased (CSO, 2015c).  Emigration increased 
dramatically, particularly amongst the younger sections of society, with a net outward 
migration of Irish nationals for the first time since the onset of the Celtic Tiger.  In 2012 the 
Irish state had the highest emigration rate in the EU with a net outward migration rate of 7.6 
per thousand.  From 2008-13 nearly 475,000 people (out of a total population of 4.6m) left 
the state, 65% of whom were aged 20-34 (Taft, 2015; Healy, 2015c).  The 20-24 age group in 
particular suffered high levels of unemployment - 19.6% in 2015, which was then twice the 
national average of 9.8% - and cuts to benefits (Taft, 2015).  Whilst an estimated total of 
338,000 came to Ireland as immigrants from 2008-14 (whether as returned Irish emigrants or 
as new non-Irish immigrants), net emigration by Irish nationals in the period May 2009-April 
2014, amounted to 124,000, (CSO, 2014).   
 
The public sector, already regarded as quite small by OECD standards (OECD, 2007; OECD 
2008; NESC, 2005) was cut from its peak of 320,000 in 2008, to 287,780 in 2013, a drop of 
10 per cent,  and the public service pay-bill was reduced by over 20% from 2009-2015 (IPA, 
2014, Dept. of Public Expenditure and Reform, 2015).  Public sector employment in the Irish 
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state represented about 18% of the total workforce in 2014 compared to 31% in the North 
(McCarthy, 2015).   
 
Meanwhile, the annual cost of interest on the national debt was expected to be almost €6.8bn, 
in 2016, and that was expected to remain more-or-less at the same level until 2020 (Social 
Justice Ireland, 2015).  All this is in a state with a population of just over 4.6m. 
 
The global financial and economic crisis from 2008 led to the onset of ‘austerity’ measures in 
the Irish state which had massive repercussions for the population, particularly the poorer 
sections.  A pragmatic adherence to a dominant ideological approach directed policy 
decisions and choices made by the state in a world dominated by global finance.  In the North 
of Ireland, where a new devolved administration had just been re-established since 2007, the 
situation was more complex and indeed different. 
 
Differences: North and South 
While the Irish state has its own government with its own apparent control over policy and 
budgets (within the confines placed on it by the global financial crisis, globalisation and 
membership of the EU and the Euro), the North has never experienced any similar degree of 
control or autonomy.  The South was able to divest itself of British political and economic 
control from the 1920s on, particularly as new relationships began to develop with the EU 
after 1973.  The North, however, despite obtaining a substantial degree of devolution, has 
maintained a dependent neo-colonial relationship with Britain, sometimes to its advantage in 
terms of resources and social policy development.  This control has often shaped social 




In the aftermath of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement in 1998 a new power-sharing 
Executive was established in the North with a wide range of discretion over public 
expenditure in devolved matters like health and social services, and education (although not 
in relation to defence, national security, fiscal matters, or foreign affairs).  However, that 
discretion had to be exercised within a budget greatly limited by a Block Grant decided upon 
by the Westminster Government, and with limited alternative means of raising extra revenue.  
Additionally, unlike any of the Coalition Governments in the South, the new Executive was a 
‘mandatory’ coalition of nationalist and unionist representatives, parties who had been and 
continued to be bitter enemies, who did not share a common ideological or political outlook 
or end-goals.  They did not agree on the constitutional future of the North, on the conflict-
ridden past or indeed about how to address the legacy of that past to help resolve present day 
conflicts.  Most of all they did not trust one another.   Despite the difficulties reaching 
agreement on policy and approach a refusal by the main parties to participate would cause the 
Executive to fall.  That in turn had potential repercussions over and above personal and 
political interests.  It could lead to another period of Direct Rule from Westminster with all 
power now placed in the hands of British ministers – whom neither side trusted either!   It 
could also lead to increased instability and could threaten an already shaky peace process. 
 
One further and more fundamentally important difference exists between North and South.  
In the South, despite the divisions which developed with the ‘War of Independence’, the 
Treaty and the Civil War, divisions which had long-lasting political and social effects, the 
vast majority of the population grew to support and identify with the new state, its 
Constitution, and its structures.  The Irish state, thus successfully created a united identity 
amongst its population, which despite religious, gender, class and increasingly ethnic 
differences, provided a relatively integrated society, identifying with that state.   
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In the new Northern Ireland), on the other hand, established in 1921, the one-third Catholic 
nationalist minority now living within its borders, rejected the entity for most its existence.  




 centuries had established a categorisation of 
differential citizenship based on ethno-religious grounds, reinforcing a sense of loss and 
resentment amongst the Catholic Irish and a sense of superiority and siege among the 
Protestant colonists (Corish, 1981).  By the time of Partition a type of economic, social, 
cultural and political apartheid had evolved in the North and while many working class and 
rural Protestants suffered poverty and deprivation, Catholics generally occupied a much more 
disadvantaged position.  Partition was to reinforce and reproduce the disadvantaged state of 
the Catholic nationalists – through the experience of discrimination, gerrymandering and 
intimidation (Aunger, 1976; Farrell, 1976; Darby, 1986).  It also ensured almost continuous 
conflict, both violent and non-violent, throughout the existence of Northern Ireland.  It led 
eventually to nearly 30 years of violent conflict from the late 1960s until the late 1990s.  
During that time nearly 4,000 people died from all sides/communities and many more were 
injured, (McKitterick et al, 2004) while thousands lost their homes (Darby, 1986) and an 
estimated 40,000 were imprisoned (Jamieson et al, 2010) 
 
It is this conflict which made focus, let alone agreement or united action, on matters like 
social policy difficult to achieve in Northern Ireland.   It is also this conflict which influenced 
developments or otherwise in social policy in Northern Ireland, throughout its existence, 
whether in the days of sectarian discrimination during the old Unionist dominated Stormont 
regime, 1921-72, or the Direct Rule years, 1972-99 and 2002-7, when security considerations 
and later the needs of the peace process often influenced British policy developments, or the 
periods of the new power-sharing Executive, 1999-2002 and from 2007 on, where the 
political conflict and its legacy continued to dominate debate.   
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It was to be the new Conservative-led Government in Westminster in 2010 which was to 
break the mould somewhat in relation to the North, by ignoring concerns about stability, 
security and conflict there, in the pursuit of an ideological commitment to austerity. 
 
The Impact of the Global Recession in N. Ireland 
The unravelling global economic crisis, from 2008 on, was felt in Northern Ireland as 
elsewhere, with a decline in the local economy and an increase in unemployment (DETINI, 
2015a).  However, the North did not suffer on the same scale as the South. Unemployment 
peaked at a 15 years high of 8.5% in 2013, compared to 15% in the South.  When 
unemployment in the North had dropped to 6.2% in September 2015 (when the UK average 
was 5.5%), this compared to a rate of 9.7% in the South, and an EU average of 9.6% 
(DETINI, 2015b).  One major reason for all this was that Northern Ireland did not suffer the 
same levels of ‘austerity’ cuts, experienced by the South in the early years of the crisis. The 
UK was not in the Eurozone and the British Labour Government had under Prime Minister 
Brown (2005-10) attempted to develop a different response to the crisis, based on what was 
termed ‘quantitative easing”.  ‘Austerity’ and accompanying public expenditure cuts only 
began to make a serious impact after the election in Britain in 2010 of a Conservative –led 
Coalition, followed by a Conservative Government in 2015, ideologically committed to 
‘austerity’.   
In its Spending Review in October 2010, the Coalition Government announced that Whitehall 
departmental budgets, other than health, education and overseas aid, would be reduced by an 
average of 19 per cent over the four year Spending Review period.  In Northern Ireland this 
resulted in cuts of 8% and 40% respectively to the resource (day to day spending) and capital 
parts of the Northern Ireland Block Grant (see below) and a cut in the overall Grant of £1.5bn 
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(2010-15), leading to cuts in services and provision (N.I. Executive, 2011).  A further cut of 
£1.3bn in the Block Grant was also anticipated up to 2019.  All services suffered cuts.  One 
policy impact was an attempt to amalgamate small schools to save on resources in Education.  
Grass verges were not cut and potholes were not filled in on roads.   
 
By 2015, cuts to the higher education budget had led to planned redundancies and early 
retirement in the sector.  In August, the University of Ulster announced a cut in staff of 210 
and a cut in 1,200 student places (Irish Times, 2015).  Similar cuts were made at Queens 
University and in the wider Further Education sector.  Further cuts were expected up until 
2018 and these were impacted by increasing ‘fines’ imposed by Westminster as a result of the 
Executive’s refusal to extend the 2012 Welfare Reform Act to the North (see below).  By late 
2015, not only was ‘austerity’ increasingly beginning to bite in the North, it was adding to a 
growing political crisis which threatened the new power-sharing institutions and potentially 
the peace process itself. 
The Northern Ireland Executive and the Peace Process 
The 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement had supposedly heralded in a new dawn for 
Northern Ireland politics, bringing to an end, decades and even centuries of conflict. 
However, the Agreement fudged many issues and left many others unresolved. Besides this, 
none of the major Unionist parties, representing the majority population, had ever been 
enthusiastic about it (McAllister et al, 2005).  The  ‘constructive ambiguity’ of the Agreement 
allowed bitter enemies to each claim ‘victory’, while at the same time continuing to work 
politically to achieve their (hugely different) end goals.  What it did not do was create an 
agreement on those end goals, or even the causes of the conflict.  It certainly did not produce 
an agreed narrative on what had been and was taking place.   
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The Agreement itself became a site of struggle over interpretation and implementation.   The 
result was that the institutions created by the Agreement, in particular the mandatory power 
sharing (between nationalists and unionists) Executive, stumbled from one crisis to another.  
Direct rule from Westminster was eventually re-imposed from 2002-2007 and while a new 
power-sharing Executive emerged in 2007 it found it difficult to agree on anything 
substantive.   
Due to the need to get cross-party consensus on issues, including social policy, some analysts 
have argued that this often led to policy being reduced to the politics of ‘the lowest common 
denominator’ and invariably reflecting conservative social values.   McLaughlin (2005), for 
example, felt that the need to find a consensus led to the ‘unambiguously deserving poor’, 
including children and older people, becoming the groups that benefited most from the 
devolved administration.   
Others, like McCann (2006), argued that the emphasis on cross-community support in the 
structures meant that there was no incentive for budding politicians to try to promote 
themselves as cross-community  (since power lies in belonging to one ‘community 
designation’ or another).  He also suggested that politicians in the Assembly were only 
interested in making appeals to their own ‘community’ constituency as a result.   
Whilst this may be true, the arrangements also reflected the divided nature of the society.  
Given the in-built Unionist majority in Northern Ireland and their experience of Unionist 
majority rule it was unlikely that the SDLP, much less Sinn Féin, would have agreed to 
anything less.  Neither the Unionists (who would have preferred majority rule) nor the 
republicans (who would have preferred an end to the union with Britain altogether and a re-
united Ireland) were happy with the arrangements, but that was all that was on offer.  More 
importantly neither of them trusted one another to rule alone! 
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Despite the political instability after the Belfast Agreement, and probably because of it, the 
peace process led to a major injection of funding for both public and voluntary/community 
sector projects.  The EU Peace Programmes supplemented other EU and British Government 
funding as well as funding from major philanthropic donors like Atlantic Philanthropies.  
Private investments appeared to be on the increase with the renewed confidence in the peace 
and a buoyant UK, Irish and global economy.   From the late 1990s to the mid-2000s, 
Northern Ireland experienced one of the most prosperous periods in its history, with 
historically low levels of unemployment and increased job opportunities.  Indeed for a 
number of years up until 2005 unemployment rates, usually the highest in the UK were 
actually lower than the UK average.  Since 2005, the unemployment rate in Northern Ireland 
has been similar to the UK average (NISRA, 2015a).    
Although the Northern economy did not reach the heights of the Celtic Tiger in the South   
there was a boom of sorts.   Between 2000 and 2009 the average rate of growth in the North 
was actually marginally above that of the UK as a whole -5.5% compared to 5.4% -  although 
this had dropped to 2% by 2009 (N.I. Executive, 2011). This added to an air of optimism 
which contrasted with the lack of political progress at Stormont and on the ground.    
By the mid-2000s, progress also seemed to have been made in relation to tackling religious 
imbalances in employment and other areas.  Throughout the 1980s and 1990s evidence from 
Government and academics had shown that Catholics remained relatively worse off than 
Protestants in Northern Ireland according to most socio-economic indicators - employment, 
housing, education and health.  They were disproportionately less likely to be managers or in 
professional jobs.  They were also 2.5 times as likely to be unemployed as Protestants, with 
an unemployment rate of 30% in 1981 and 35% in 1984 compared to 12% and 13% 
respectively, for Protestants (S.A.C.H.R., 1987; Smith and Chambers, 1991).  The 
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Continuous Household Survey in 1993 reported that from 1985-91 Catholics were twice are 
likely as Protestants to be dependent on means tested benefits like Income Support and 
Family Credit and, still, 2.5  times more likely to be unemployed (PPRU, 1993).   
New equality legislation in 1989 and in 1998 (associated with the Belfast Agreement), 
combined with affirmative action programmes in the large public sector, where the state had 
a large input into recruitment practices, plus the decline in the traditional sectors of Protestant 
employment - Shipbuilding, Engineering and Security - led to significant changes in 
employment patterns and a greater balancing in employment opportunities began to emerge 
between the two communities (Equality Commission N.I., 2012).  There was also evidence of 
a growing Catholic middle class.  There was increasing concern that some working class 
Protestant areas like the Shankill Road and parts of East Belfast, traditionally reliant on the 
old engineering industry were exhibiting relatively high levels of unemployment and low 
levels of educational attainment (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2011).  However, despite this, 
Catholics were still disproportionately found among the poorer sectors of society and living 
in the most deprived areas - 16 out of the 20 most disadvantaged wards were Catholic in 2010 
(NISRA, 2010). 
Despite the financial crises unfolding in 2007/8, the power-sharing Executive’s 2008-11 
Budget and the Programme for Government, showed signs of optimism for the future.  The 
Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister kept the anti-poverty strategy 
developed in 2006 under Direct Rule, a strategy developed by the ‘New Labour’ 
Government, setting targets to end poverty and social exclusion by 2020 (OFMDFM, 2006).  
It also published a child poverty strategy in March 2011 to augment this. Although the then 
British Labour Government introduced some austerity measures from 2008, the impact of 
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austerity didn’t start to affect the Executive until a new Conservative-led Coalition took 
power in Westminster in 2010.  
However, disagreements over a range of issues continued, from how to deal with the ‘legacy 
of the conflict’, to ‘culture and identity’ issues, and policing and justice issues and social 
policy innovation or development were limited.   According to Birrell and Gray (2010) out of 
27 Acts passed from 2007-10 only 6 related to social policy areas which had been devolved.  
The areas where the Executive found most agreement related to the extension of Westminster 
legislation, such as Pension legislation in 2008, the copying of policy legislation in Scotland 
and Wales, or populist measures like the abolition of prescription charges, a rates (council 
tax) freeze and the decision to postpone the introduction of water charges (Birrell and Gray, 
2010), as well as the freezing of University fees in 2012 (NIDirect, 2012).  Gray and Horgan, 
(2010)  argued, however, that there were many areas of social policy where Northern Ireland 
still lagged behind other parts of the UK, such as in relation to the development of a 
Childcare Strategy. 
The Stalemate over Welfare Cuts 
In 2012, after two years of ‘austerity’ cuts the Welfare Reform Act was introduced in Britain 
by the Conservative-led Coalition.  It was this which was to lead to another political crisis in 
the Executive in the North, in 2014/15, when the nationalist parties refused to extend the 
legislation to the North.   
The Act had caused widespread controversy in Britain, with sweeping cuts to welfare 
benefits, stringent testing for people on disability benefits, increased conditionality for job-
seekers’ benefits and a benefits cap. For example, Disability Living Allowance (DLA) was to 
be replaced with ‘Personal Independence Payment’ but this included more stringent testing, 
while Universal Credit was to replace a host of other benefits but with increased conditions 
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attached.  The aim was to take as many people as possible off benefits as a result. Probably 
most controversial was the introduction of what became known as, the ‘bedroom tax’ 
whereby people’s housing benefit was reduced if it was deemed their dwelling had more 
bedrooms than they required!  
With, historically lower rates of pay and higher rates of unemployment, poverty, disability, 
long-term illness and dependence on benefits (NISRA, 2015a; NISRA, 2015b), the extension 
of the Act to Northern Ireland caused concern, especially to the nationalist parties who tended 
to represent a disproportionately greater number of constituents from the poorer sectors of 
society.    The tests for those on disability benefits were particularly worrying.  In 2015, 
amongst 16-64 year olds, 27% were economically inactive (unable to work due to 
disability/illness or caring responsibilities) compared to 22% in the UK (DETINI, 2015b).   
There were also more claimants of Disability Living Allowance than anywhere else in the 
UK.  In 2010 there were 183,710 DLA claimants in Northern Ireland, with a rate of 102.7 
claimants per 1,000 members of the population, compared to 49.6 in England, 65.9 in 
Scotland and 80.7 in Wales (Carson, 2011).  Just over one in 10 of the population in Northern 
Ireland were in receipt of DLA in 2014 (DSD, 2014).   
Besides all this, a number of academic reports also highlighted some of the adverse effects of 
the Act in England and the potential impact if it was extended to the North (Browne, 2010; 
MacInnes et al, 2012; Lupton,  et al, 2015). 
 
Despite this, ever since Northern Ireland was established in 1920, there had been an historical 
convention to maintain parity in terms of social security rates, coverage and regulation across 
the UK, with the UK Government promising to cover any added costs (above taxation raised 
in the North) via the central Exchequer in London (Birrell, 2009). For example, the Corbyn 
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Committee (1925) agreed that social security payments should be uniform across the UK, 
while the post-World War Two Welfare State was extended to Northern Ireland in the face of 
initial opposition from the ruling conservative Unionist Party, with the inclusion of a 
commitment from Westminster to cover any extra costs out of general taxation to maintain 
parity.  The welfare state developed the concept of citizenship rights (and expectations) 
linked to welfare – rights to free healthcare and social care, education and social security 
supports – a concept which remains under-developed in the South to this day.  Since Northern 
Ireland was historically one of the poorest regions in the UK, this convention on parity had 
usually in the past been of benefit to the local population.   
This is one of the reasons (among others) why a political crisis developed in the North over 
Welfare Reform after 2012. While the nationalist parties, Sinn Féin and the Social 
Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and the Greens, all of which tend be on the Left of the 
political spectrum in terms of socio-economic issues, continued to block the extension of the 
Westminster Welfare Reform Act and benefits cuts to the North, they were opposed by the 
Unionist parties, which tend to be on the Right.  The Unionists argued that there was a 
tradition of maintaining parity with Westminster on benefits.  They also argued that refusing 
to extend the Welfare cuts to the North would simply mean that extra funding for the uncut 
benefits would come out of the Block Grant, and that would deny funding for other services 
(education, social care, etc.) for other (possibly more ‘deserving’?) citizens.   
Whilst the power-sharing Executive had a wide range of discretion over public expenditure in 
devolved matters like health and social services, and education, it had virtually no control 
over raising revenue.  Fiscal policy remained in the hands of Westminster.   The main source 
(93%) of funding for the Executive was the Block Grant from the Treasury in London. Using 
the Barnett formula, established in 1978, funding was provided from general taxation across 
the UK, based on population share and comparable spending programmes in England, with 
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the aim of providing parity of service provision and benefits levels across the UK (Northern 
Ireland Executive, 2011).   Although the Grant could be allocated in whichever way the 
Executive saw fit, if it decided to provide greater services or benefits than in England then it 
had to reduce spending in some other area.  Much of the resource (day to day spending) 
budget contained in the Block Grant was destined for continuing running costs and salaries in 
the various public services leaving little room to manoeuvre, unless a dramatic change was 
made in provision.  For example, Health and Social Services accounted for 41% and 
Education (not including post-secondary) for 19% of the resource budget allocation in 2011-
15 (N.I. Executive, 2011). 
This refusal to extend the Welfare Act led to the imposition of ‘fines’ by the UK Treasury on 
the Block Grant of £13m, £87m and £114m, from 2013-15 and more were threatened for 
every year the Act was not introduced.  An attempt to resolve the issue at the Stormont House 
Talks in December 2014 (held primarily to try and resolve a wide range of outstanding 
‘legacy of the conflict’ issues), had led to proposals that involved acceptance of the ‘reforms’  
but with agreement to financially compensate anyone whose benefits were cut as a result.  
This was to be paid for out of loans (agreed by the British Government) and savings from 
other areas of public expenditure, the selling off of public land and other assets along with 
public sector redundancies (DFA, 2014). However, the apparent agreement dissipated in 
February 2015 with bitter recriminations between the DUP and Sinn Féin.  Sinn Féin argued 
that they had been promised that all losses to benefits would be compensated by the deal, 
while the DUP said that wasn’t possible and that Sinn Féin should have known that at the 
Talks.  The crisis continued into the Autumn of 2015, when it was augmented by allegations 
of continued IRA activity, and attempts to suspend the workings of Stormont by both major 




While the crisis at Stormont was unfolding, a provisional budget was agreed based on the cut 
Block Grant, leading to swinging cuts to all Departments (except Health) and particularly 
hitting the Higher Education sector.  In March 2015, a voluntary redundancy scheme was 
announced for public sector workers in a range of areas and there were fears of up to 20,000 
public sector redundancies (FT, 2015).  
An important point to note in this regard is that Northern. Ireland’s economy is particularly 
dependent on the public sector.  In 2015 public sector employment per working age adult was 
higher in Northern Ireland (18%) than in the UK (14%), and private sector employment lower 
(41%) than the UK (59%) (MacFlynn, (2015a).  In 2011 it was estimated that the public 
sector accounted for 32% of total employment in the North - higher than the UK at 17% or 
the South at 18% (McCarthy, 2015). Additionally, much of the local private sector was also 
dependent on public sector spending, with the result that public expenditure represented 
62.4% of total output - significantly higher than the 39.8% for the UK as a whole (N.I. 
Executive, 2011).  This has often been highlighted by the Westminster Government, since the 
onset of ‘austerity’ in 2010, with claims that Northern Ireland’s public sector is ‘too big’.  
Others however, have argued that the ‘problem’ is rather than the private sector is ‘too 
small’!  As a peripheral economy emerging from conflict Northern Ireland had a relatively 
small private sector with relatively low levels of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 
comparison to the South.  The private economy is dominated by small enterprises with 99% 
of businesses employing less than 50 people, (similar to the UK figure) and 72% being sole 
traders, and 97% of firms domestically owned (MacFlynn, 2015b).   
 
In 2015 Northern Ireland had the highest public expenditure in the UK.  Although dropping 
in the face of austerity cuts from £11,408 per head of population in 2009/10 to 10,961 in 
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2012/13, it was still 23% above the UK average of £8,936 (HMT, 2014).  Out of nearly 
£573bn of UK identifiable spend in 2013-14; England accounted for £467bn, Scotland £55bn, 
Wales £31bn and Northern Ireland £20bn (HMT, 2014).  It’s worth noting that Northern 
Ireland’s Block Grant only covered £10.4bn of that expenditure, the rest coming from 
Westminster based Departments (Northern Ireland Executive, 2011).  The impact of public 
sector and public expenditure cuts was felt to be particularly problematic in an area so 
dependent on public expenditure for jobs, services and for the local economy.   
 
In May 2015, a new Conservative Government was elected in Westminster promising to end 
all Government debt by a programme of public expenditure cuts.  The Government was not 
interested in tackling the debt via greater taxation and a spreading of the burden amongst the 
richer sections of society.  Indeed, ‘austerity’ for the Conservatives seemed less about 
reducing public debt per say and more about an ideological desire to reduce welfare 
expenditure and taxation - to cut the size of the welfare state rather than the deficit.  One of 
the main arguments put forward by the Chancellor, George Osborne, in his ‘emergency’ 
Budget speech of June 2015, was that reduced welfare and lower taxes were good for the 
economy, while at the same time increased defence spending was necessary for the security 
of the state (Osborne, 2015).   Twelve billion pounds of cuts in welfare spending were added 
to the £21bn in cuts already legislated for by the previous Conservative led Government 
mainly in relation to social security benefits.  The welfare cuts would be achieved by 
concentrating welfare on those considered the deserving poor –‘the elderly, the vulnerable 
and disabled people’ – rather than on those considered the undeserving – those able-bodied, 
particularly the young, who were able to work but instead, spent ‘a life on benefits’ (Osborne, 
2015).   ‘Austerity’ was thus limited to a particular group in society, rather than across the 
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board.   In practice however, the cuts to welfare up to 2015 had affected a wide range of 
vulnerable people, particularly those with disabilities.  
 
There was a of course the question about how ‘necessary’ it was to have more public 
expenditure cuts in order to tackle public debt.  Brown University economics Professor Mark 
Blyth, for example, argued that the use of ‘quantitative easing’ by the Labour Government in 
2008-10 rather than ‘austerity’ has actually stabilised the UK’s public debt by 2011 (Blyth, 
2015). By 2015, the economy was also growing.  While Government debt remained high by 
post World War Two standards  it was a particular ideological perspective to demand that all 
Government debt be eliminated as soon as possible, regardless of the consequences.  It was 
also an ideological perspective to suggest that that should only be achieved by targeting 
welfare cuts.   
Conclusion 
The global economic crisis which emerged in 2008, and, more specifically, the responses to it 
in the industrialised rich countries of the world, reflected a dominant ideological discourse, 
which attempted to restore confidence in the capitalist system, by shoring up the failed 
financial systems, and maintaining the economic and political power of the real rulers of the 
world.  ‘Austerity’ was a tool in a wider agenda to reassert neoliberalist thinking in the global 
economy and reject any serious consideration of alternative approaches. 
In Ireland, North and South, the experience of the crisis and ‘austerity’ were different, 
reflecting different social, economic, and political contexts and influences, as well as 
different forms of democratic control.  As well as major differences in the experience and the 
extent of the development of welfare (and in particular the development of notions of a 
Comment [F1]: I’m suggesting leaving 
this in.  What do you think? 
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‘right’ to welfare) there have also been major differences in terms of the experience of the 
economic crisis and different responses to ‘austerity’ and welfare cuts. 
 
While Irish Governments from 2008 on may not themselves have been ideologically driven 
to promote a new neoliberalist agenda nonetheless they fitted in with that agenda by taking 
the pragmatic approach of accepting with a large degree of enthusiastic energy the dominant 
discourse on ‘austerity’, and public sector cuts.  Whilst they lacked democratic control they 
still had choices, even if the choice was simply to raise a protest at the way their state was 
being treated by the EU and IMF.  A pragmatic approach to the powerful seemed the best 
option.  Indeed when the new anti-austerity Government elected in Greece in January 2015 
(BBC News, 2015) called on states within the Eurozone to support them, they failed to get 
the support of the Irish Government or anyone else. The choice was stark for the Greeks, 
accept the EU austerity package or leave the Eurozone.   
 
Up until 2015, Northern Ireland did not suffer the same level of cuts to the public sector, 
welfare services and benefits or the same levels of unemployment or emigration, as were 
experienced in the South.   Initially this was because, the Browne Labour Government in 
Britain opposed wholesale ‘austerity’ as the way out of the crisis.  The elections of 
Governments in 2010 and 2015 committed to ‘austerity’ however meant that the North was 
then to experience in a probably much more brutal way the sharp end of ‘austerity’ from 2010 
and especially from 2015 onwards. Lack of democratic control in the North was made 
particularly obvious along with the lack of agreement within the devolved Executive.  Lack 
of agreement is largely linked to the old animosities over the constitutional question, 
continuing political uncertainty, division and distrust.   How ongoing and increasing 
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‘austerity’ impacts on the peace process is difficult to say at present since there are so many 
other factors which could create adverse impacts as well.   
 
 While the nationalist parties in the North made some sort of a stand against ‘austerity’, their 
limited power seemed unlikely by itself to be able to challenge indefinitely, the attempts by 
the Cameron Government to roll back further the welfare state and promote a new 
neoliberalist agenda.   
 
Despite this, there have been signs in recent months of a challenge to the austerity agenda and 
the roll back of state responsibility for welfare in Britain, Ireland and other parts of Europe.  
The dramatic election of Jeremy Corbyn, as Leader of the British Labour Party and the rise of 
anti-austerity political parties in Spain, Catalonia, the Basque Country, Greece and in the 
South of Ireland, all suggest that alternatives exist out there if people want them.  There is 
also the possibility that faced with such political challenges others currently accepting the 
‘austerity’ discourse but not strongly ideologically committed to the new neoliberalist 
dismantling of state welfare may make a stand against it, especially as the global economy 
begins to improve, and tax revenues increase. The only thing that is certain is that people 
have agency.  They are not mere passive observers of unfolding events.  The approaching 
100
th
 Anniversary of the 1916 Uprising reminds us of that.  It also reminds us that nothing is 
permanent whether in terms of the restructuring of the capitalist economy or the organisation 
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i
 Terminology is controversial on the island of Ireland.  Nationalists usually refer to ‘the North’ and ‘the South’ 
for example, reflecting their desire for unification.  Unionists, who want to maintain separation usually use the 
official constitutional terms for those entities, ‘Northern Ireland’ and ‘Ireland’ although ‘Ireland’ is also the 
name of the island.  In this chapter the terms ‘Northern Ireland’ and ‘Irish state’ will be used interchangeably 
with ‘North’ and ‘South’, to distinguish between the two entities (and the island) with no intention of insult to 
any tradition. 
